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In  an  ulttmatum  bargaming  game  players  1  and  2  can  drstribute  a  positive  amount  of  money  m 
the  following  way:  first,  player  1 determines  his  demand  which  player  2  can  then  etther  accept  or 
induce  confhct,  i.e.  player  2  faces  the  ultimatum  either  to  accept  player  l’s  proposal  or  to  have  no 
agreement  at  all.  Experimentally  observed  ultimatum  bargaimng  decisrons  with  amounts  ranging 
from  0.50  to  100  German  marks  are  statistically  analysed.  The  demands  of  player  1 are  compared 
with  the  acceptance  behavior  of  player  2  with  the  help  of  consistency  tests  in  which  a  subject  has 
to  decide  in  the  positron  of  both  players.  Finally,  we  constder  ulttmatum  bargaining  games  with 
more  than  just  one  round  where,  except  for  the  final  round,  nonacceptance  does  not  cause  conflict 
but  another  round  of  ultrmatum  bargainmg  for  a  smaller  cake. 
1. Introduction 
In  many  bargaining  situations  it  seems  possible  to  terminate  bargain- 
ing  by  imposing  an  ultimatum.  Even  if  this  possibility  would  not  be 
used  frequently,  this  still  would  have  to  be  explained.  Therefore  one 
needs  a  theory  of  ultimatum  bargaining  behavior. 
Bargaining  games  with  the  possibility  to  terminate  bargaining  by 
imposing  an  ultimatum  are  also  interesting  from  a  game-theoretic 
perspective.  Since  the  solution  of  such  games  can  be  rather  extreme,  the 
game-theoretic  solution  is  socially  rather  unacceptable.  Therefore 
ultimatum  bargaining  is  important  for  testing  the  predictive  power  of 
the  game-theoretic  solution.  Richard  H.  Thaler  (1988)  even  includes 
ultimatum  bargaining  in  his  list  of  ‘Anomalies’  and  relates  it  to  other 
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social  decision  problems. 
In  all  the  studies  which  we  consider,  only  two  players,  1  and  2, 
negotiate  how  to  distribute  a given  positive  amount  c  of  money.  Thus, 
if one  player  wants  to impose  an ultimatum  on the  other,  he only  has  to 
determine  his  own  demand.  The  other  player  can  then  only  either 
accept  the  residual  amount  or  choose  conflict  which  implies  0  payoffs 
for  both  players.  In  section  2  we  consider  one-round  ultimatum 
bargaining  games  or  subgames.  Our  statistical  analysis  of  experimen- 
tally  observed  decision  data  compares  and  analyses  all available  results 
of  one-round  ultimatum  bargaining  games. 
A  disadvantage  of  these  experiments  is that  we only  know  player  2’s 
reaction  to  player  l’s  specific  demand  but  not  how  he  would  have 
reacted  to  other  demands  by  player  1.  This  can  be  avoided  if,  before 
knowing  player  l’s  actual  demand  d,,  player  2 is asked  for  any  possible 
demand  d,  whether  he  will  accept  it  or  not.  In  this  way  one  observes 
not  only  player  2’s  acceptance  decision  but  a  complete  acceptance 
strategy  of  player  2.  In  section  3 we compare  the  results  of  Giith  et  al. 
(1982)  and  Kahneman  et  al.  (1986a,b)  who  both,  although  in  slightly 
different  ways,  have  tried  to  observe  the  complete  acceptance  strategy 
of  player  2.  Since  player  2  determines  his  strategy  independently  from 
player  l’s  demand  d,,  the  same  subject  could  assume  the  position  of 
player  1 and  the  position  of  player  2.  Gtith  et  al.  and  Kahneman  et  al. 
both  have  exploited  this  possibility  to  compare  how  a  given  subject’s 
demand  d,  as player  1 is related  to his acceptance  behavior  as player  2. 
Binmore  et  al.  (1984,1985)  performed  experiments  with  two  rounds 
of  ultimatum  bargaining:  in the  first  round  player  1 first  determines  his 
demand  d,  which  2  can  then  either  accept  or  not,  as  before.  But  if  2 
does  not  accept  player  l’s  proposal  this  does  not  necessarily  imply 
conflict.  Instead  there  follows  another  round  of  ultimatum  bargaining 
for  a  ‘smaller  cake’  c’  where  now  player  2  can  first  determine  his 
demand  d,(O  I  d,  I  c’)  which  player  1  can  then  either  accept  or 
choose  conflict.  Their  conclusions  have  inspired  further  experiments 
with  more  than  one  round  of  bargaining.  In  section  4  we compare  the 
results  of  Binmore  et al. with  those  of  Giith  and Tietz  (1986)  Neelin  et 
al.  (1988)  as  well  as  with  the  comparable  decision  data  of  Ochs  and 
Roth  (1989).  The  final  remarks  summarize  the  results  and  indicate  lines 
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2.  Strategic  power  versus  distributive  justice 
The  game-theoretic  solution  of  one-round  ultimatum  bargaining 
games  is  rather  obvious.  If  d,  < c,  player  2  should  obviously  accept 
player  l’s  proposal.  Thus  player  1 can  ask  for  nearly  all of  c  and  leave 
only  a  crumb  of  the  ‘cake’  c  for  player  2.  Let  C( >  0)  be  the  smallest 
positive  unit  of money.  If  player  2 would not  accept  the  demand  d,  =  c 
by  player  1  the  optimal  demand  of  player  1  would  be  d:  =  c -  c 
(otherwise  d,  =  c  can  also  be  an  equilibrium  demand).  Since  this 
demand  will be  accepted  by player  2,  the  solution  payoffs  are  c -  c  for 
player  1  and  c  for  player  2,  i.e.  player  1  receives  nearly  the  whole 
amount  c.  Due  to  this  extremely  ‘ unfair’  distribution  of  rewards 
one-round  ultimatum  bargaining  games  are  one  of  the  most  critical 
paradigms  for  testing  the  predictive  power  of  the  game-theoretic  solu- 
tion.  Since  ultimatum  bargaining  games  are  extensive  games  with 
perfect  information  (all  information  sets  are  singletons),  the  ap- 
propriate  solution  concept  for  such  games  is that  of  a subgame  perfect 
equilibrium  point  (see  Selten  1975). 
In  a  simple  reward  allocation  experiment  (see,  for  instance,  Mikula 
1973;  and  Kahneman  et  al.  1986a,b)  a subject  has  to  allocate  the  total 
reward  c( > 0)  among  two  individuals  who  both  contributed  to  obtain 
the  total  reward  c. Viewed  as a game  the  solution  of  such  an  allocation 
problem  is  clearly  that  the  allocator  takes  all  of  c  for  himself,  thereby 
leaving  nothing  for  his  partner.  This  similarity  of  the  game-theoretic 
allocation  explains  why  the  two decision  problems,  ultimatum  bargain- 
ing  games  and  reward  allocation  problems,  are  often  seen  as  closely 
related  (see  Thaler  1988;  and  Forsythe  et  al.  1988).  The  essential 
differences  between  the  two  decision  problems  are,  of  course,  that  the 
allocator  in  reward  allocation  does  not  have  to  fear  a  rejection  by  his 
partner  and  that  reward  allocation  problems  are  neither  presented  as 
strategic  games  nor  usually  perceived  as  situations  where  egoistic 
motivations  should  dominate.  The  reward  allocation  experiments  of 
Hoffman  and  Spitzer  (1982,1985)  are  more  complicated  since  the  total 
reward  depends  on  the  allocation  result  and  since  players  can  agree  on 
side  payments. 
In  the  study  of  Giith  et  al.  (1982)  the  amount  c  varied  from  4  to  10 
German  marks.  Furthermore,  all subjects  played  successively  two games 
with  different  partners  in  order  to  observe  whether  experience  affects 
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games  with  c  ranging  from  4  to  10  German  marks  were  observed  by 
Gi.ith et  al.  (1982:  tables  4  and  5).  Due  to  random  pairing  the  (sorted) 
results  listed  in  table  1  usually  are  decision  data  of  different  subjects. 
We  first  indicate  whether  it was  the  1st or 2nd  game.  For  each  game  we 
give  the  amount  c  and  the  play,  consisting  of  players  l’s  demand  d, 
and player  2’s acceptance  decision  a,(  d, ).  Here  a,( d,)  =  1 means  that  2 
accepts  proposal  d,  whereas  a,( d,)  = 0 means  that  2 chooses  conflict. 
The  ‘auction  winners’  (data)  in  table  1  are  the  plays  observed  by 
Gtith  and  Tietz  (1985,  1986)  who  auctioned  the  position  of  ultimatum 
bargainers  before  letting  the  auction  winners  play  the  ultimatum 
bargaining  game.  In  their  experiments  subjects  were  first  informed 
about  the  rules  of  second  highest  bid-price  auctions  and  that  it  is  a 
dominant  strategy  to  bid  the  true  value  in  such  auctions.  In  a  second 
highest  price  auction  (see  Vickrey  1961)  the  object  is sold  to  the  highest 
bid(der)  at  the  price  of  the  second  highest  bid.  After  these  instructions 
all  subjects  participated  in  normal,  4-person,  second  highest  bid-price 
auctions  so that  the  authors  could  assess  the proportion  of subjects  who 
accepted  that  bidding  the  true value  is optimal.  The  share  of inessential 
deviations  from  bidding  truthfully  (less  than  5%  of  the  true  value)  was 
85%. 
Once  subjects  were  familiar  with  bidding  in second  highest  bid-price 
auctions  they  were  told  that  they  were  then  going  to  bid  for  strategic 
positions.  They  were  informed  how  to  play  ultimatum  bargaining 
games  with  amounts  c  of  15,  55,  and  100  German  marks  and  then 
asked  to bid  either  for  the  position  of  player  1 or  for  the  one  of  player 
2,  i.e.,  we  conducted  an  independent  auction  for  both  ultimatum 
bargaining  positions  and  every  single  game.  Afterwards  the  auction 
winners  were  determined  and  privately  informed  about  the  price  (the 
next  highest  bid  for  the  same  position)  which  they  had  to  pay  for  their 
strategic  position.  Then,  knowing  their  own  price  but  not  the  one  of 
their  opponent,  the  two auction  winners  played  the  ultimatum  bargain- 
ing  game.  Denote  by  X,  player  i’s  win  in  the  ultimatum  bargaining 
game  and  by  p,  the  price  which  i  has  to  pay  for  his  position  i  in  the 
ultimatum  bargaining  game.  The  final  win  of  the  subject  who  became 
player  i  is  X, -p,_  These  final  payoffs  were  paid  immediately  after  the 
game.  As  can  be  seen  from  table  1  three  games  were  played  succes- 
sively.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  decision  data  in  the  lst,  2nd,  and  3rd 
game  for  the  amounts  c =  15,  55,  and  100  German  marks  usually  came W.  Giirh.  R.  Ttetr  /  Ultrmorum  bargarnrng  behavror  423 424  W.  Giiih,  R.  Tterr  /  Ultrmarum  bargaznrng  behavmr 
from  different  groups  of  subjects  since  the  strategic  positions  of  each 
game  were  auctioned  independently. 
The  next  data  set of  table  1, named  ‘2nd  round  subgames’  (data),  are 
the  plays  which  were  observed  in  the  second  round  of  two-round 
ultimatum  bargaining  games  where  no  agreement  has  been  reached  in 
the  first  round.  The  first  subset  of  decision  data  in  the  1st  and  2nd 
games  gives  the  corresponding  results  of  Giith  and  Tietz  (1988a),  and 
the  second  subset  with  observations  only  for  the  1st  game  contains  the 
results  of  Neelin  et  al.  (1988).  The  data  of  Ochs  and  Roth  (1989)  are 
listed  by aggregating  the  first  three  games,  games  4 to 6,  and games  7 to 
10,  respectively.  The  ‘3rd  round  subgames’  are  the  corresponding  data 
of  Ochs  and  Roth  (1989).  We  only  included  results  of  last-round 
subgames  with equal  discount  factors  for  both  players.  The  correspond- 
ing  results  of  Binmore  et  al. (1984,  1985)  were  not  available. 
In  table  2 we give the  mean  reward  amount  c,  the  mean  demand  d,, 
the  mean  relative  demand  4,  (4,  =  d,/c),  and  the  mean  acceptance 
decision  6,  individually  for  the  different  sets  of  experimentally  ob- 
served  data  shown  in table  1 as well as for  their  aggregates.  It  should  be 
mentioned  that  all  ultimatum  bargaining  games  presented  in  tables  1 
and  2  are  strategically  equivalent  although  they  are  embedded  in 
different  scenarios.  When  playing  the  ultimatum  game  the  costs  of 
strategic  positions  as  well  as  the  loss  of  efficiency  implied  by  not 
reaching  an  agreement  for  the  bigger  pie  in  the  first  rounds  are  both 
sunk  costs  which  do  not  have  any  impact  on  the  optimal  decision 
behavior. 
If  N >  10,  the mean  relative  demanded  shares  4,  ranging  from  0.6  to 
0.69  do not vary dramatically.  Nevertheless,  table  2 reveals  how strongly 
strategically  irrelevant  aspects  can  influence  ultimatum  bargai~ng  de- 
cisions.  This  is  most  clearly  demonstrated  by  the  mean  acceptance 
decision  6,  varying  from  0.22  in  the  3rd  games  of  the  2nd  round 
subgames  of  the  shrinking  cake  experiments  to  0.92  in  the  auction 
winners  experiments.  Auctioning  strategic  positions  seems  to  induce 
the  most  consistent  kind  of  behavior. 
Game  theory  predicts  _d, to  be  nearly  1  and  S,  =  1  for  d,  < c  since 
d,  =  c  and  dr* =  c -  c  are  the  only  equilibrium  demands.  Contrary  to 
this,  d,  was consistently  and  significantly  smaller  than  1. Furthermore, 
the  sometimes  extremely  low  acceptance  rates  6,  in  table  2  indicate 
that  players  2  are  often  enough  willing  to  sacrifice  quite  a  monetary 
amount  in order  to punish  player  1 for making  an ‘unfair’  proposal  (see W. Giirh, R.  Tietr  /  Ufrrmarum bargaimng  behavror  425 
Gi.ith  (1988)  who  relates  such  a  behavior  to  equity  theory).  A  previous 
loss  of  efficiency  by  failing  to  reach  an  agreement  on  the  bigger  cake 
seems  to  increase  this  willingness  to  punish  dramatically.  Of  course,  in 
most  last-round  subgames  of  table  2  the  mean  amount  c  to  be 
distributed  has  been  rather  low.  The  only  exceptions  are  the  second 
round  subgames  of  Giith  and  Tietz  (1988a)  with  c =  12.94  and  c =  15.93 
German  marks  as  a  result  of  the  games  with  an  almost  unshrinking 
cake. 
An  attempt  to  explain  the  relative  demand  behavior  of  player  1 
globally  by  a  linear  regression  function  of  the  amount  c  and  the 
experience  parameter  ‘game’  fails.  Dummy  variables  for  the  different 
experiments  also  do  not  influence  demand  behavior  significantly. 
For  the  ‘auction  winners’  experiments  it  has  been  shown  that  the 
demand  behavior  was  positively  in~uenced  by  the  bids  in  the  auction 
(cf.  Gtith  and  Tietz  1985,1986).  More  globally,  _br, i.e.  the  bid  b,  of 
player  1 divided  by  c,  has  a  distinct  influence  on  4,: 
i$, =  0.372  +  0.422  _br,  R2 =  0.400,  N  =  36 
(7  (0.059)  (0.088) 
t  5.42  4.80 
a  <  0.001  0.001~  0) 
R2  is  the  coefficient  of  determination  and  N  the  number  of  observa- 
tions.  u  denotes  the  standard  deviation  of  the  regression  coefficients,  t 
the  correspond~g  t-statistic,  and  (Y the  si~ificance  level. 
For  the  last-round  subgames  let  cP denote  the  cake  size  of  the  second 
last  round.  The  relation  c/cP  is  called  the  cake-shrinking  parameter  of 
the  previous  round.  We  have  tried  to  explain  the  relative  demand 
behavior  4,  by  the  cake-shrinking  parameter  c/c,,+,  by  the  cake  size  c, 
the  experience  parameter  ‘game’,  the  previous  sacnfrces  (i.e,  the  amounts 
given  up  by  turning  down  the  previous  offer),  and  the  experimental 
dummies  reflecting  the  various  experimental  procedures.  None  of  the 
variables  has  a  statistically  significant  influence. 
Since  S,  assumes  only  values  of  0  and  1,  the  assumptions  of  the 
classical  linear  regression  model  with  regresssand  S,  are  not  fulfilled. 
The  optimal  separation  function  for  acceptance  decisions  (see  Hartung 426  W.  Giith.  R.  T~erz /  Ultrmatum  bargarnrng  behavmr 
and  Elpelt  (1986:  140  f.)  as well as Giith  and  Tietz  (1988b)  for  details), 
which  maximizes  the  number  of  correctly  explained  acceptance  deci- 
sions,  is given  by 
%(_sZ) = 
i 
0  for  4,  2  sz 
1  otherwise.  (24 
with 
5,  =  0.737  +  0.00262~.  (2b) 
According  to  s2 player  2 is willing  to  accept  a lower  share  if  the  cake  is 
bigger.  Function  (2)  explains  83%  of  the  136  observed  acceptance 
decisions.  Similar  results  can  be  obtained  if  the cake  size parameter  c  is 
substituted  by dummy  variables  for  different  experiments.  The  mean  of 
the  93  accepted  relative  demands  4:  is with  0.61  significantly  smaller 
than  the  mean  of  the  43  rejected  relative  demands  d;  (Mann-Whitney 
U  test,  (Y  < 0.00001). 
Kravitz  and  Gunto  (1988)  as well as Giith  et al. (1990)  try to  explore 
psychological  reasons  for  ultimatum  bargaining  behavior.  In  the  experi- 
ment  of  Kravitz  and  Gunto  subjects  do  not  play  the  ultimatum 
bargaining  game  properly.  As  player  2,  subjects  are  confronted  with 
predetermined  demands  (robot  strategies)  by  player  1 where  in  two  of 
three  conditions  the  greedy  proposal  is  supplemented  by  a  nasty  (the 
‘power  comment’)  or  a justifying  (the  ‘need  comment’)  remark.  Sub- 
jects  were paid  a fixed  amount  unrelated  to  the  offer  and  their  reaction 
to it.  Especially,  in the  case  of  the power  comment  subjects  should  have 
recognized  that  they  were  not  faced  with  a  real  opponent.  Before  the 
experiment  subjects  were  asked  which  demand  they  would  choose  as 
player  1,  which  proposal  they  considered  as  fair,  and  what  they 
required  as  player  2  to  accept.  In  a  post-experimental  questionnaire 
they  were  furthermore  asked  to  rate  the  personality  of  their  ‘opponent’ 
and  the  procedure  of  ultimatum  bargaining  on  discrete  bipolar  scales. 
Subjects  in  the  Gtith  et  al.  (1990)  experiment  first  answered  the 
personality  questionnaire  16PA,  developed  by  Brandstatter  (1988).  In 
addition  to  some  personal  characteristics  like  sex,  age,  education, 
subjects  were  required  to  rate  their  personality  on  33  discrete  bipolar 
scales.  We  do  not  give  a  detailed  description  of  this  personality 
questionnaire  as  it  is  not  related  to  ultimatum  bargaining.  The  main W.  Giith,  R.  Tietz  /  Ultrmatum  bargarnrng  behavior  427 
reason  for  using  it  is  an  explorative  attempt  to  explain  ultimatum 
bargaining  behavior  by general  psychological  characteristics.  To  reduce 
the  number  of  dimensions  Giith  et al.  (1990)  apply  factor  analysis  and 
then  use  these  factors  to  explain  experimentally  observed  ultimatum 
bargaining  decisions  by  these  subjects.  Psychological  variables  were 
useful  in  explaining  the  bidding  and  bargaining  decisions  but  usually 
for  different  variables  different  factors  were  relevant. 
For  their  ultimatum  bargaining  experiment  Gtith  et  al.  (1990)  uses 
the  auctioning  procedure  of  Giith  and  Tietz  (1985,  1986)  in  a  2-fac- 
torial  design:  each  of  the  amounts  c =  DM18,  DM32,  and  DM54  is 
played  once  in  the  usual  way  and  once  with  an  additional  transfer 
payment  to  player  2  which  equals  the  cake  size  c  and  which  is  paid 
independently  of  what  happens  in  bargaining.  Thus  player  2  is sure  to 
receive  c  in  addition  to  what  he  earns  in  ultimatum  bargaining.  As  a 
consequence,  the  game-theoretic  solution  gives both  players  nearly  the 
same  amount  (c  -  c  and  c + E, respectively)  so  that  the  game-theoretic 
solution  is  supported  by  the  distribution  standard  of  equal  monetary 
rewards  (see  Homans  1961;  and  Giith  1988).  Unfortunately,  the  hy- 
pothesis  that  player  1  will  demand  significantly  more  in  case  of  the 
transfer  payment  had  to  be  rejected. 
Prasknikar  and  Roth  (1989)  compare  ultimatum  bargaining  behavior 
with  the  experimental  results  for  sequential  best  shot  games  (Harrison 
and  Hirshleifer  1989).  In  a  sequential  best  shot  game  player  1  first 
determines  his  contribution  and  then,  knowing  l’s  decision,  player  2 
chooses  how  much  he  contributes.  For  both  players  the  level  of  the 
public  good  is determined  purely  by  the  maximal  individual  contribu- 
tion.  The  unique  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  point  (Selten  1975) 
prescribes  a  0  contribution  by  player  1,  i.e.  only  player  2  has  to  bear 
the  burden  of providing  the public  good.  In  the experiment  of  Harrison 
and  Hirshleifer  (1989)  the  equilibrium  payoff  of  player  1  and  2  was 
$3.70  and  $0.42,  respectively.  Nevertheless  their  experimental  results 
strongly  support  the  game-theoretic  prediction. 
Since  in  the  Harrison  and  Hirshleifer  experiment  a  subject  knew 
only  his  own  payoff  function,  these  best  shot  games  can  be  viewed  as 
games  with  incomplete  information  whereas  ultimatum  bargaining,  as 
defined  above,  relies  on complete  information  (i.e.,  all payoff  functions 
are  common  knowledge).  Prasknikar  and  Roth  (1989)  experimentally 
compare  best  shot  games  with  and  without  complete  information  with 
ultimatum  bargaining  games.  They  confirm  the  conclusions  by  Harri- 428  W.  Giith.  R  T&z  /  Ultrmatum  bnrgarnrng  behavzor 
son  and  Hirshleifer  for best  shot  games  with  complete  information.  For 
best  shot  games  with  incomplete  information  the  behavior  is  different 
from  equilibrium  behavior  although  it is moving  in  the  direction  of  the 
equilibrium  decisions.  Most  importantly,  for  both  variants  of  best  shot 
games  the  observed  means  are  much  closer  to  equilibrium  behavior 
than  for  the  ultimatum  bargaining. 
To  explain  the  puzzling  difference  in  the  predictive  power  of  game 
theory  for  best  shot  games  and  ultimatum  bargaining  Prasknikar  and 
Roth  (1989)  explore  the  experimentally  observed  reaction  behavior  to 
non-equilibrium  opening  moves.  Whereas  in  best  shot  games  the 
game-theoretic  opening  move  yields  the  highest  payoff  expectation,  the 
best  opening  move  in  ultimatum  bargaining  is  to  leave  a  significant 
amount  (about  40%  of  the  cake)  for  player  2. 
Equal  positive  contributions  in  best  shot  games  are  obviously  ineffi- 
cient  since  one  of  the  two contributions  is completely  useless.  If  sharing 
the  burden  of  providing  the  public  good  is impossible,  fairness  consid-. 
erations  cannot  be  applied.  Furthermore,  the  very  obvious  aspect  of 
efficiency  requires  extreme  payoff  distributions.  The  results  of  Hoff- 
man  and  Spitzer  (1982,  1985)  demonstrate  that  the  desire  for  efficiency 
can  be  a  strong  motivation.  In  ultimatum  bargaining,  efficiency  does 
not  have  any  impact  on  the  payoff  distribution  since  it  only  excludes 
conflict.  Best  shot  games  are  therefore  more  complex  than  ultimatum 
bargaining  games  and  more  comparable  to  the  ‘complicated  games’  of 
Gtith  et  al.  (1982)  which  allow  for  efficient  and  inefficient  payoff 
distributions. 
3.  Consistency  of  demand  and  acceptance  behavior 
In  games  without  chance  moves  a  (pure)  strategy  vector  uniquely 
determines  a play  but  many  different  strategy  vectors  might  imply  the 
same  play.  In  the  specific  context  of  ultimatum  bargaining  games  a 
play  consists  of  players  l’s  proposal  d,  and  2’s  reaction  6,(d,)  to  this 
specific  proposal  by  player  1.  Whereas  the  choice  of  d,  corresponds  to 
choosing  a  strategy  for  player  1,  the  same  is  not  true  for  player  2.  A 
pure  strategy  of player  2 is a function  6,(  .)  which  assigns  to all possible 
demands  d,  by  player  1  a decision  S,(d,)  =  1 or  S,( d,)  =  0.  Thus  the 
plays  listed  in  table  1  give only  a point  information  about  the  general 
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An  obvious  way  to  observe  the  strategy  a,(  .)  instead  of  only  a 
reaction  S,(d,)  to  one  specific  demand  d,  is  to  ask  player  2  how  he 
would  react  to  all  possible  demands  d,  before  being  confronted  with 
the  specific  decision  d,  of  player  1,  and  to  determine  the  result  of 
ultimatum  bargaining  by  the  demand  d,  of  player  1 as  well  as  by  the 
hypothetical  decision  behavior  6,(  .)  of  player  2,  i.e.,  if  6,(d,)  =  1, 
player  l’s  proposal  is  accepted  whereas  for  a,(  d,)  =  0  conflict  results. 
In  the  consistency  test  of  Gi.ith  et  al.  (1982)  every  subject  first  had  to 
determine  his  demand  d,  as  player  1 and  then  this  minimal  acceptance 
payoff  m2  as  player  2,  presuming  that  the  subject  will  only  accept 
proposals  d,  with  c -  d,  2  m *. Subjects  were  informed  in  advance  that 
both  their  decisions  d,  and  m2  matter  since  every  subject  is engaged  in 
two  ultimatum  bargaining  games,  once  as  player  1  and  once  as  player 
2. 
Because  of  the  experimental  procedure  Giith  et  al.  (1982)  were  able 
to  identify  both  decisions  d,  and  m2  of  a  given  subject.  There  were  6 
cases  with  d,  +  m2 >  c,  15  with  d,  +  m2 =  c,  and  17  with  d,  +  m2 <  c. 
Apparently,  subjects  with  d,  +  m2 >  c  consider  themselves  as  excep- 
tionally  tough  whereas  subjects  with  d,  +  m,  -c c  would  accept  more 
ambitious  demands  d,  than  their  own  one.  Subjects  with  d,  +  m2 =  c 
seem  to  rely  on  a  point  solution,  i.e.,  they  consider  one  and  only  one 
agreement  as  acceptable.  For  instance,  7  of  the  15  subjects  with 
d,  +  m2 =  c  proposed  the  equal  split  of  c.  We  will  not  investigate  the 
individual  decisions  in  further  detail  since  we  want  to  compare  the 
results  of  Gtith  et  al.  (1982)  with  those  of  Kahneman  et  al.  (1986a  and 
b),  who  provide  only  aggregated  data. 
Kahneman  et  al.  (1986)  use  ultimatum  bargaining  games  to  demon- 
strate  the  discrepancy  between  the  ‘assumptions  of  economics’  like,  for 
instance,  profit  maximization  for  firms  and  the  actually  observable 
decision  behavior.  In  their  ‘Study  1:  Resisting  Unfairness’,  they  tried  to 
investigate  how  a  subject  as  player  2  would  react  to  ‘unfair’  payoff 
proposals  by  player  1. Their  subjects  also  assumed  both  the  position  of 
player  1 and  the  one  of  player  2.  First  a  subject  had  to  decide  as  player 
2  for  any  possible  allocation  of  c =  $10  ranging  from  d,  =  $0.50  to 
d,  =  $9.50  in  steps  of  c =  $0.50  whether  he  would  accept  it  or  not. 
Afterwards  he  had  to  allocate  c  as  player  1 by  choosing  his  demand  d, 
out  of  ($0.50,.  . .) $9.50). 
The  experiment  was  conducted  in  a  psychology  and  a  commerce 
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dents  (the  ‘Psych/Psych’  column  of  table  3),  psychology  students  as 
player  1  were  facing  commerce  students  being  player  2  (the 
‘Psych/Corn’  column  of  table  3)  and  vice  versa  (the  ‘Corn/Psych’ 
column  of  table  3).  The  aggregate  data  given  by  Kahneman  et  al. 
(1986b:  table  1)  are  the  mean  share  (c  -  d,)/c  offered  to  player  2,  the 
proportion  of  equal  splits  d,  =  c/2,  the  mean  minimal  demanded  share 
m/c,  the  proportion  of  minimal  demands  m2  with  m2 2  O.l5c,  and 
the  number  of  subjects.  In  table  3 we  give  these  results  in  the  first  three 
columns  mentioned  above.  The  fourth  column  of  table  3  contains  the 
corresponding  values  for  the  consistency  test  of  Giith  et  al.  (1982:  table 
7).  Whenever  they  are  defined  we  also  list  the  corresponding  results  of 
table  1  individually  for  the  lst,  2nd,  and  3rd  game  as  well  as  for  all 
three  games  together.  For  the  sake  of  completeness  we  specify  the 
corresponding  values  separately  for  low-rewards,  auction-winners,  and 
last-round  subgame  experiments  as  well  as  for  the  whole  set  ‘of  data 
contained  in  table  1. 
Table  3  reveals  some  surprising  differences  in  the  results.  We  focus 
our  attention  on  the  proportion  of  equal  splits  proposed  by  player  1. A 
similar  analysis  could  be  performed  for  the  proportion  of  minimal 
demanded  shares  >  0.15  but  the  results  of  consistency  tests  could  not 
be  compared  with  those  of  normal  ultimatum  bargaining  games. 
There  is  no  significant  difference  in  the  proportion  of  equal  splits  of 
the  Psych/Psych  and  the  Psych/Corn  group  ((Y =  0.37),  but  the  average 
share  of  both  these  groups  is  significantly  greater  than  the  correspond- 
ing  value  of  the  Corn/Psych  group  ((Y <  0.05).  Thus,  psychology  stu- 
dents  tend  to  propose  equal  splits  more  often  than  students  of  business 
administration.  However,  the  Corn/Psych  group  has  a  significantly 
greater  proportion  of  equal  splits  than  the  one  observed  in  the  con- 
sistency  test  of  Gtith  et  al.  ((Y <  0.05).  We  suppose  that  this  is  mainly 
due  to  the  way  of  performing  experiments  (e.g.  only  a  random  sample 
of  subjects  was  paid  in  the  Kahneman  et  al.  experiment). 
But  even  the  proportion  of  equal  splits  (43%)  observed  by  Gtith  et  al. 
(1982)  is  much  higher  ((Y <  0.001)  than  the  one  in  normal  ultimatum 
bargaining  games  (15%  in  average).  Thus,  consistency  tests  seem  to 
induce  subjects  to  consider  and  to  perceive  the  situation  in  quite  a 
different  way.  Analysing  the  situation  both  from  the  viewpoint  of 
player  1 and  2  apparently  reduces  the  incentive  to  exploit  the  strategic 
advantage  of  player  1.  Altogether  this  shows  that  subjects  hardly  ever 
apply  game-theoretic  reasoning  to  determine  their  behavior  but  that  the 432  W.  Giith,  R.  Ttetr  /  Ultrmatum  bargatnrng  behavmr 
extent  of  paying  attention  to  strategic  aspects  can  be  strongly  affected 
by  the  experimental  environment  whenever  the  monetary  incentives  are 
rather  low. 
Bolle  (1988)  uses  consistency  tests  to  explore  whether  high  reward 
experiments  can  be  substituted  by  low  cost  experiments  with  high 
potential  rewards  but  a  rather  low  reward  expectation.  The  paper  is 
mainly  an attempt  to justify  experiments  where  not  all subjects  are paid 
according  to  their  success  but  only  a random  sample.  Bolle  performed 
four  different  experiments:  in  the  D2  experiment  12  pairs  of  subjects 
played  for  an  amount  c =  DM2;  in the  P20  experiment  with  c =  DM20 
the  monetary  reward  expectation  was  the  same  since  only  1 of  10 pairs 
of  subjects  was  actually  paid.  A  similar  distinction  holds  for  the  D20 
and  P200  experiment  with  a  deterministic  or  probabilistic  monetary 
reward  expectation  of  DM20  per  pair. 
The  proportion  of  equal  splits  with  62.5%,  50%,  41.7%,  and  55%  for 
the  D2,  P20,  D20,  and  P200  experiment  was always  higher  than  the  one 
of  the  consistency  test  by  Giith  et al.  which  already  exceeded  consider- 
ably  the  corresponding  quota  of  15%  for  usual  ultimatum  bargaining 
games.  On  the  other  hand,  the  proportion  of  minimal  demanded  shares 
(>  0.15)  by  player  2  with  79.2%,  SO%, 66.7%,  and  80%  was  always 
higher  than  the  corresponding  data  of  Kahneman  et  al.  (1986b).  One 
could  say  that  Bolle’s  observations  reveal  a demand  behavior  of  player 
1  similar  to  Kahneman  et  al.  and  an  acceptance  behavior  of  player  2 
corresponding  to  the  results  of  Giith  et  al. 
4.  How  to bargain  for  a shrinking  cake? 
The  speciality  of  the  bargaining  situations  analysed  above  is  that 
there  is  just  one  round  of  ultimatum  bargaining,  i.e.,  one  player 
proposes  an  agreement  which  the  other  can  accept  or not  and  then  the 
game  is over. The  other  extreme  is the case  of infinitely  many  rounds  of 
ultimatum  bargaining  where  in  each  round  one  player  suggests  an 
agreement  which  the  other  can  accept  or  reject  and  where  in  the  latter 
case  a new  round  of  ultimatum  bargaining  follows. 
A  model  of  the  latter  type  has  been  rigorously  analysed  by  Rubin- 
stein  (1982)  who  assumes  that  the  two  players  take  turns  in  being  the 
proposer.  Thus  in  all  odd  rounds  t =  1,  3,  5,  . . .  player  1  would  be W.  Giiih, R.  Tletz  /  Ultimatum bargarnrng  behaoror  433 
proposing  whereas  in  all  even  rounds  t =  2,4,  6,  . . .  this  would  be  done 
by  player  2.  If  no  agreement  is  reached  in  finite  time,  both  players 
receive  nothing.  In  case  an  agreement  to  distribute  c  is  reached  in 
round  t,  player  i =  1, 2 receives  x,P:-~.  Here  X, is  the  amount  allocated 
to  i  and  p,  with  0 <  p,  <  1 is  player  i’s  discount  factor. 
Thus  the  two  players  can  only  allocate  the  full  amount  c  if  they 
reach  an  agreement  immediately,  i.e.  in  round  t =  1.  Otherwise  the 
‘cake’,  the  amount  which  can  be  distributed,  will  shrink  with  each 
round  not  yielding  an  agreement. 
Rubinstein  (1982)  has  shown  that  the  game-theoretic  solution  im- 
plies  an  immediate  agreement  according  to  which  player  1 receives  the 
share  (1 -  p,)/(l  -  p1p2)  of  the  amount  c  whereas  2’s  share  is  pz(l  - 
p,)/(l  -  p1p2).  Thus  the  more  patient  player  1  is  the  more  successful 
he  will  be.  Furthermore,  the  special  case  p  =  p1  =  pz  with  0 <  p  -c  1 
illustrates  that  it  is usually  better  to  be  first  in  proposing  an  agreement. 
For  p  =  p1  =  p2  the  share  of  both  player  1  and  2  is  l/(1  +  p)  and 
p/(1  +  p),  respectively.  Thus  player  l’s  share  approaches  1  for  p  +  0 
whereas  for  p  +  1 the  solution  agreement  approaches  the  equal  split  of 
C. 
The  experiment  of  Binmore  et  al.  (1984,  1985)  deviates  from  the 
previous  ultimatum  bargaining  experiments  in  the  direction  of  the 
game  model  analysed  by  Rubinstein  (1982).  Instead  of  just  one  round 
Binmore  et  al.  assume  that  there  are  two  rounds  of  ultimatum  bargain- 
ing.  In  the  first  round  player  1 proposes  d,  with  0 I  d,  I  c  which  2 can 
accept  or  reject.  If  2  rejects  d,  the  second  round  follows  where  now 
player  2 can  propose  how  to  allocate  the  smaller  cake  c’  with  0 <  c’  -C  c 
by  choosing  his  demand  d,  with  0 I  d,  I  c’.  In  case  that  1  rejects  d, 
the  game  is over  and  both  players  receive  nothing.  Otherwise  the  payoff 
result  is  determined  by  the  accepted  proposal,  i.e.,  players  1  and  2 
receive  d,  and  c -  d,,  respectively,  in  case  of  an  agreement  in  the  first 
round  and  c’ -  d,  and  d,  if  an  agreement  is  reached  in  the  second 
round. 
If  the  second  round  is  reached,  player  1 should  accept  any  proposal 
d,  satisfying  d,  < c’.  Assuming  that  1  will  not  accept  the  proposal 
d,  =  c’  leaving  nothing  for  him  player  2’s  optimal  demand  d,  is 
therefore  d:  = c’ -  c  where  again  c  denotes  the  smallest  money  unit. 
Anticipating  this  result  for  the  second  round,  player  2,  in  turn,  will 
accept  any  proposal  d,  with  c -  d,  >  c’  -  c  which  shows  that  player  1 
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Thus  the  game-theoretic  solution  predicts  an  immediate  agreement 
determined  by  player  l’s  demand  d:  =  c -  c’. 
In  the  experiment  of  Binmore  et al.  (1984,  1985)  the  initial  cake  was 
c =  100  pence  and  the  smaller  cake  c’ =  25  pence.  Thus  the  solution 
payoffs  of  player  1  and  2  are  75  pence  and  25  pence,  respectively. 
Compared  to  the  one-round  ultimatum  bargaining  games,  described 
and  analysed  in  sections  2  and  3,  the  relation  of  equilibrium  payoffs 
c’/(  c -  c’)  =  l/3  b e ween  player  2 and  1 in  the  Binmore  et  al.  experi-  t 
ment  is rather  moderate.  In  the  one-round  ultimatum  bargaining  games 
the  relation  of equilibrium  payoffs  E/( c -  6) between  players  2 and  1 is 
nearly  zero. 
Table  4  contains  the  experimental  results  of  Binmore  et  al.  (1985: 
fig.  1).  The  level  of  aggregation  in  table  4  is determined  by  Binmore  et 
al. who do not  list  individual  decision  data.  Whereas  the  main  tendency 
(30  out  of  82  observations)  in  the  1st  game  is to propose  an  equal  split, 
the  strong  tendency  (50  out  of  81  observations)  in  the  2nd  game  is  to 
play  like  a  game  theorist  (Binmore  et  al.  1985:  1179).  For  Binmore  et 
al.  the  equal  division  of  c is an  obvious  and  acceptable  compromise  for 
an unexperienced  subject.  However,  once  a subject  is fully  aware  of  the 
game  structure,  considerations  of  strategic  power  should  dominate. 
The  study  of  Binmore  et  al.  has  inspired  further  experiments  with  at 
least  two rounds  of  ultimatum  bargaining.  Giith  and  Tietz  (1985,  1986) 
have  explored  more  extreme  equilibrium  payoff  relations  c’/(  c -  c’) 
for  the  different  initial  cake  sizes  c =  15,  35,  and  55  German  marks  by 
using  c’ =  0.1~  and  c’  = 0.9~.  In  table  4  we have  listed  their  results  in 
the  same  way  as those  of  Binmore  et al.  individually  for  the  two values 
of  the  ‘cake  shrinking’  parameter  c’/c  =  0.1  and  c’/c  =  0.9.  The 
game-theoretic  relative  demand  _di*  =  0.9  for  c’/c  = 0.1  and  dl* =  0.1 
for  c’/c  = 0.9  was  rarely  observed.  For  c’/c  = 0.1  only  2  out  of  11 
observations  in  the  1st  game  and  1 out  of  10  in  the  2nd  game  lie in  the 
corresponding  range  0.85  I  d,  I  0.95;  for  c’/c  =  0.9  no  observed  value 
4,  coincides  with  the  game-theoretic  solution  d,*.  Thus  the  conclusion 
of  Binmore  et  al.  that  more  experienced  subjects  confirm  with  the 
game-theoretic  prediction  is  limited  to  rather  moderate  equilibrium 
payoff  relations.  As  in  one-round  ultimatum  bargaining  games  the 
game-theoretic  solution  looses  nearly  all  its  predictive  power  if  it 
induces  payoff  results  which  are  socially  unacceptable. 
Neelin  et  al.  (1988)  keep  the  equilibrium  payoff  relation  l/3  be- 
tween  player  2 and  player  1 of  Binmore  et al. (1984,  1985)  but  vary  the W.  Giith,  R.  Twtz  /  Ultimatum  bargarnrng  behavror  437 
possible  length  of  bargaining  plays.  The  ‘framing’  of  this  experiment 
has  been  criticised  by  Binmore  et  al.  (1988)  (see  Forsythe  et  al.  (1988: 
table  1)  for  some  differences  in  the  experimental  design  of  ultimatum 
bargaining  experiments).  With  two  possible  rounds  of  ultimatum 
bargaining  the  initial  cake  c =  $5  shrinks  to  $1.25,  with  three  rounds  it 
shrinks  first  to  $2.50  and  then  to  $1.25,  whereas  for  five  possible 
rounds  the  initial  cake  c =  $5  shrinks  to  $1.70,  then  to  $0.58,  then  to 
$0.20,  and  finally  to  $0.07.  Backward  induction  shows  that  in  all  cases 
the  optimal  opening  demand  is  di*  =  $3.75,  i.e.  the  equilibrium  payoff 
relation  (between  players  2 and  1) is l/3  regardless  of  whether  bargain- 
ing  can  extend  over  two,  three  of  five  rounds. 
For  two  rounds  of  ultimatum  bargaining  Neelin  et  al.  confirm  in  a 
surprisingly  clear  way  the  major  tendency  in  the  2nd  game  of  the 
Binmore  et  al.  experiment.  It  can  be  seen  from  table  4 that  33  out  of  40 
observations  lie  in  the  corresponding  range  0.65  <  d,  5  0.75.  Since  all 
subjects  participated  in  a  trial  session  with  four  possible  rounds  of 
ultimatum  bargaining,  the  subjects  in  the  Neelin  et  al.  experiment  can 
be  regarded  as  experienced. 
But  with  more  than  two  possible  rounds  of  ultimatum  bargaining  the 
game-theoretic  solution  is  a  rather  poor  prediction.  The  general  tend- 
ency  observed  by  Neelin  et  al.  (1988)  is  that  the  initial  demands  d, 
leave  just  the  second  round  cake  for  player  2, i.e.  d,  is equal  to  c minus 
the  second  round  cake.  The  means  of  the  observed  relative  demands  are 
0.73,  0.53,  and  0.66  for  2-round,  3-round,  and  5-round  ultimatum 
games,  respectively  (computed  from  Neelin  et  al.  1988:  appendix  2). 
Only  for  two  possible  rounds  of  ultimatum  bargaining  such  a  behavior 
confirms  the  game-theoretic  prediction  dr* =  $3.75. 
In  a  second  experiment  Neelin  et  al.  (1988)  allowed  for  more 
experience  by  letting  subjects  play  the  5-round  game  four  times,  once 
for  practice  and  three  times  for  an  initial  cake  of  size  $15.  Neither 
experience  nor  the  increase  of  rewards  changed  the  major  conclusions 
described  above. 
The  general  observation  by  Neelin  et  al.  that  player  1  leaves  the 
second  round  cake  for  player  2 in  ultimatum  bargaining  games  with  at 
least  two  possible  rounds  seems  to  suggest  the  following  limited  ra- 
tionality  approach  to  ultimatum  bargaining  (see  Giith  and  Tietz  (1988) 
for  another  attempt):  instead  of  backward  induction  underlying  the 
game-theoretic  solution  concept  of  ‘subgame  perfect  equilibrium  points’ 
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according  to which  player  1 rightly  concludes  that  he can  demand  all of 
the  difference  between  the  initial  amount  c  and  the  second  round  cake. 
However,  he  avoids  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  further  strategic  inter- 
action  by  assuming  that  player  2 completely  controls  the  situation  once 
the  second  round  of  ultimatum  bargaining  is reached. 
Unfortunately,  the  results  of  Giith  and  Tietz  (1988a)  show  that 
subjects  entertain  such  considerations  only  in  very  special  situations, 
e.g.  in  situations  where  the  equilibrium  payoff  relation  is  rather  mod- 
erate.  Neither  the  mean  demanded  share  _d,  =  0.72  for  c’/c  =  0.1  nor 
the  one  of  4,  =  0.57  for  c’/c  =  0.9  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  player  1 
leaves  the  second-round  cake  c’  for  player  2.  Neelin  et  al.  themselves 
have  already  expected  that  their  hypothesis  will  not  be  confirmed  in 
extreme  situations  where  the  equilibrium  payoff  relation  is  socially 
unacceptable. 
But  do  the  experimental  results  of  Giith  and  Tietz  (1988a)  really 
reject  the  hypothesis  that  subjects  rely  on  the  limited  rationality  ap- 
proach:  ‘Leave  the  second  round  cake  for  player  2’.  In  our  view,  the 
impressing  results  of  Neelin  et  al.  (1988)  indicate  that  subjects  first 
calculate  the  difference  between  the  initial  and  the  second  round  cake 
in  order  to  derive  an  aspiration  level.  If  the  implied  payoff  distribution 
is either  socially  acceptable  or  such  that  player  2 will not  dare  to  reject 
it,  then  this  amount  is really  demanded.  But  if  the  cost  of  rejecting  an 
unfair  proposal  is  rather  low  for  player  2,  player  1  obviously  gives  up 
this  initial  aspiration  level  and  applies  other  considerations  to  de- 
termine  his  demand.  In  this  sense  the  empirical  results  of  the  shrinking 
cake  experiments  seem  to  provide  a  promising  starting  point  for  a 
limited  rationality  approach:  subjects  first  apply  a rather  simple  proce- 
dure  like  the  ‘leave  the  2nd  round  cake  for  player  2’  considerations. 
The  recommendation  of  this  procedure  then  has  to  pass  an  acceptabil- 
ity  test.  Only  in  case  this  test  fails  a  more  complicated  procedure  for 
analysing  the  situation  is  used,  etc.  We  think  that  viewing  decision 
making  as  a process  of  subsequent  decision  filters  corresponding  to  an 
increasing  degree  of  sophistication  is probably  the  most  fruitful  way  to 
derive  a  concept  of  limited  rationality.  It  has  been  suggested  by  an 
anonymous  referee  that  one  should  debrief  subjects  in  order  to  test 
whether  this  corresponds  to  the  intellectual  process  actually  employed 
by  the  subjects. 
Since  our  main  intention  is  to  compare  the  different  experimental 
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the  decision  data  which  Neelin  et  al.  observed  for  more  than  two 
possible  rounds.  In  table  4  one  can  therefore  find  only  the  results  for 
two possible  rounds  of  ultimatum  bargaining  listed  in  the  same  way  as 
the  results  of  Binmore  et  al. (1984,  1985)  and  Giith  and  Tietz  (1988a). 
Since  the  game  was  not  repeated  we  cannot  account  for  experience 
effects.  Before  playing  the  two-round  games,  subjects  in  the  Neelin  et 
al.  experiment  participated  in  a  trial  run  with  four  possible  rounds. 
From  the  instructions  (see  Neelin  et  al.  1988:  appendix  1)  we  induce 
that  the  two-round  games  were  the  first  decision  problem  that  subjects 
had  to  face  after  their  trial  run. 
The  very  systematic  study  of  Ochs  and  Roth  (1989)  is based  on  a 4 
by  2  factorial  experimental  design.  All  four  constellations  with  ap- 
proximate  discount  factors  (0.4;  0.4),  (0.4;  0.6),  (0.6;  0.4),  and  (0.6;  0.6) 
for  players  1  and  2  have  been  explored  with  two  and  three  rounds  of 
ultimatum  bargaining.  In  table  4 we only  included  the  results  of  games 
with  two  rounds  of  proposals  and  equal  discount  factors,  since  in 
games  with  unequal  discount  factors  players  1  and  2  cannot  divide  a 
constant  amount  in  later  rounds  in  the  same  way  as  in  the  ‘com- 
plicated’  games  of  Gtith  et al. (1982).  The  results  of  Ochs  and  Roth  are 
listed  in  the  same  way  as  the  other  results  contained  in  table  4  where 
experience  is  reflected  by  summarizing  the  results  of  games  1-3,  4-6, 
and  7-10,  respectively. 
There  is a weak  tendency  in the game-theoretic  direction  in the  sense 
that  most  observations  for  the  discount  factor  0.4  lie in  the  interval  for 
the  game-theoretic  relative  opening  demand  dr* =  0.6,  and  that  the 
interval  0.45  < d,  I  0.55  contains  most  observations  if,  due  to  the 
discount  factor  0.6,  the  relative  opening  demand  4:  is  equal  to  0.4. 
This  influence  of  the  discount  factor  or  cake-shrinking  parameter  is 
highly  significant  ((Y < 0.001).  But  similarly  to  the  results  of  Giith  and 
Tietz  (1988a)  for  c’/c  = 0.9  players  1 rarely  go below  the equal  share  of 
c  with  their  demand  d,  if game-theoretic  reasoning  tells  them  to  do so 
(the  whole  range  dr I  0.45  contains  no observation  in spite  of  d:  = 0.4 
for  the  discount  factor  0.6). 
Since  payoffs  were  actually  paid  in only  one  of  ten  successive  games, 
subjects  in  the  experiment  of  Ochs  and  Roth  faced  a  rather  low 
probability  that  their  decision  will actually  matter.  Since  experience  did 
not  have  any  significant  influence,  one  might  have  preferred  fewer 
repetitions  with  more  significant  payoffs.  It  is  an  interesting  observa- 
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two-round  bargaining  games  although  the  game-theoretic  solution  does 
not  depend  at all on  this parameter.  Ochs  and  Roth  try to  explain  their 
observations  by  modifying  the  ‘utility  function’.  Unlike  our  implicit 
assumption  when  determining  the  game-theoretic  solution  that  players 
are  solely  motivated  by  monetary  rewards  they  incorporate  distribu- 
tional  concerns  directly  into  the  utility  functions. 
We  strictly  reject  the  idea  to  include  results  of  analysing  a  social 
decision  problem  into  the  utility  functions  of  the  interacting  agents. 
Utility  functions  are an instrument  of describing  individual  characteris- 
tics  needed  to  define  a  social  decision  problem.  Furthermore,  all  our 
experiences  from  ultimatum  bargaining  experiments  indicate  that  sub- 
jects  do  not  ‘maximize’  but  are  guided  by  sometimes  conflicting 
behavioral  norms  (see,  for instance,  the  discussion  of  Giith  (1988)).  The 
utility  approach  necessarily  neglects  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  intel- 
lectual  process  which  subjects  apply  to  derive  their  decision  behavior 
as,  for  instance,  indicated  in  our  discussion  of  the  Neelin  et  al.  results. 
Ultimatum  bargaining  with  alternating  offers  and  no  announced 
upper  bound  for  the  number  of  rounds  has  been  experimentally  in- 
vestigated  by  Weg  et  al.  (1990).  Of  course,  it  will  always  be  common 
knowledge  that  bargaining  has  to  end  after  finitely  many  rounds. 
Actually,  bargaining  was  not  allowed  to  last  for  more  than  20  periods. 
As  Ochs  and  Roth,  the  authors  used  equal  and  unequal  discount 
factors  by  providing  tables  showing  the  cumulative  discounts  up  to  44 
periods.  The  major  conclusions  are  that  the  subgame  perfect  equi- 
librium  point,  i.e.  the  game-theoretic  solution,  is  rejected  and  that 
norms  of  equality  and  equity  seem  to  be  more  consistent  with  the 
experimentally  observed  decision  data. 
We  now  would  like  to  compare  the  various  data  sets  contained  in 
table  4.  ‘* ’ indicates  the  interval  containing  the  game-theoretic  relative 
opening  demand  _d,  * =  di*/c  by  player  1.  Whereas  for  Binmore  et  al. 
and  Neelin  et  al.  the  *  interval  is one  of  the  focal  points,  this  is never 
true  for  the  true  for  the  Giith  and  Tietz  results.  As  already  indicated 
above,  the  corresponding  results  of  Ochs  and  Roth  depend  crucially  on 
the  cake-shrinking  parameter:  If  c’/c  is 0.4,  then  the  *  interval  is  the 
main  focal  point.  But  if  the  cake-shrinking  parameter  is  0.6,  the 
game-theoretic  predicition  has  lost  all  its  predictive  power.  In  these 
cases  the  interval  containing  the  equal  split  _d,  =  0.5  becomes  the  main 
focal  point.  But  even here  still  16 of  80 players  1 (i.e.  20%)  ask  for  more 
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al.  reveal  most  clearly  double  peakedness  where  the  two  focal  points 
correspond  to  the  equal  split  4,  =  0.5  and  the  game-theoretic  relative 
opening  demand  ~3: =  0.75.  Whereas  for  rather  unexperienced  players 
the  main  focal  point  of  these  two is the  equal  split interval,  the  opposite 
is  true  for  more  experienced  subjects. 
Table  5  contains  more  illustrative  average  results  of  table  4  as  the 
average  size  c  of  the  original  cake,  the  average  (relative)  opening 
demand  d,(d,),  the  average  acceptance  rate  a,( d,)  of  the  opening 
demand  d,,  and  the  number  N of  observations.  All  amounts  have  been 
expressed  in  German  marks  by  evaluating  1  English  pound  (9)  by 
DM3.50  and  1 American  dollar  ($)  by  DM2.  The  amounts  of  Ochs  and 
Roth  have  been  divided  by  10  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  subjects 
were paid  in only  one  of  10 games.  The  values  d,  and  4,  of  Binmore  et 
al.  have  been  computed  by  setting  4,  equal  to  the  midpoint  of  the 
concerning  interval  in  table  4.  A  ‘-’  indicates  that  the  corresponding 
observations  were  not  available  to  us. 
Gtith  and  Tietz  are  the  only  ones  who  have  varied  monetary  incen- 
tives.  Furthermore,  they  have  used  the  strongest  average  monetary 
motivation.  Compared  to  the  studies  of  Neelin  et  al.  and  Ochs  and 
Roth  there  is  a  surprising  variance  in  the  average  acceptance  rates 
observed  by  Gtith  and  Tietz.  Whereas  these  range  from  0.75  to  0.9  for 
Neelin  et  al.  and  Ochs  and  Roth,  the  corresponding  interval  for  Giith 
and  Tietz  is  from  0.3  to  0.9.  Here  one  should,  of  course,  keep  in  mind 
that  Gtith  and  Tietz  have  considerably  fewer  observations  (N  =  10  or 
11  as compared  to  N 2  24).  But  in our  view  the  decisive  reason  for  the 
extreme  differences  in  the  average  acceptance  rates  is  the  fact  that 
Giith  and  Tietz  have  imposed  extreme  cake-shrinking  parameters  c’/c. 
More  specifically,  the  extremely  low  average  acceptance  rates  have 
been  caused  by  the  almost  unshrinking  cake  c’/c  =  0.9. 
The  average  relative  opening  demands  4,  are  consistently  greater 
than  0.5  even in  the  cases  with c’/c  >  0.5  where  &*  < 0.5.  Thus  players 
1  do  not  seem  to  trust  game-theoretic  reasoning  when  it  yields  them 
less  than  half  of  the  initial  cake.  There  is  no  significant  effect  of 
experience  in  the  average  data  of  Ochs  and  Roth.  The  observations  of 
Giith  and  Tietz  reveal  a slight  influence  of  experience  in  the  sense  that 
the  mean  demanded  shares  d,  decrease  and  that  average  acceptance 
rates  S,(d,)  increase  with  more  experience.  Compared  to  this  Binmore 
et  al. have  observed  a significant  increase  of  4,  with  experience  so that 
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the  two  experiments.  It  should  be  mentioned  that,  due  to  the  games 
with  c’/c  =  0.9,  Giith  and  Tietz  observed  quite  a number  of  conflicts  or 
nonefficient  agreements  and  that  all  subjects  could  notice  this  (all 
players  1  were  seated  in  one  room  and  all  players  2  in  a  neighboring 
room  and  games  were  played  simultaneously).  This  common  experience 
of  conflicts  or  inefficient  agreements  could  have  induced  subjects  to  be 
less  demanding  in  the  subsequent  repetition.  In  the  Binmore  et  al. 
experiment  subjects  had  to  rely  purely  on  individual  experiences. 
A  linear  regression  of  the  acceptance  behavior  of  player  2  with  the 
cake-shrinking  parameter  c’/c  and  the  relative  demand  4,  of  player  1 
as  regressors  for  the  262  first  rounds  of  two-round  games  (withouth  the 
data  of  Binmore  et  al.  1985)  yields  the  following  optimal  separation 
function: 
S,(s2)  = 
0  for  d,  >  5, 
1  otherwise,  (34 
with 
s,  =  0.867  -  0.449  c’/c.  (3b) 
Other  variables  as  the  cake  size  c  and  the  experience  parameter 
‘game’  have  no  significant  influence.  Function  (3)  explains  86.6%  of  the 
262  acceptance  decisions  by  player  2. The  cake-shrinking  parameter  has 
significant  impact  on  acceptance  behavior.  Observe  that  game  theory 
predicts  _s2  =  1 -  c’/c  and  that  the  equal  split  solution  implies  s2 =  0.5. 
According  to  function  (3)  players  2 seem  to  determine  their  behavior  by 
balancing  the  incentives  to  comply  with  both  extreme  principles.  More 
specifically,  the  value  _s, is  always  higher  than  the  relative  demand 
_s2  =  0.75  -  O.~C’/C  implied  by  giving  equal  weights  for  both  principles. 
The  latter  phenomenon  could  be  justified  by  the  hypothesis  that 
players  2 want  to  allow  for  small  deviations  from  a  certain  distribution 
norm,  e.g.  the  one  implied  by  equal  weights  for  the  game-theoretic  and 
the  fifty-fifty  solution. 
In  the  following  we  want  to  analyse  the  average  demand  behavior  d, 
over  all  425  observations  by  some  regressions.  Postulating  significance 
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following  result: 
4,  =  0.679  -  0.210  c’/c,  R2 =  0.126,  N =  425.  (4) 
The  coefficient  of determination  can  be improved  by including  the  cake 
size  c  as regressor: 
4,  =  0.659  -  0.242  c’/c  +  0.00488  c,  R2 =  0.189,  N =  425.  (5) 
Thus  a  bigger  cake  leads  to  higher  relative  demands.  The  highly 
significant  influence  of  c  (the  partial  correlation  coefficient  is  0.270) 
illustrates  how  important  it  is  to  vary  the  cake  size  c  when  exploring 
ultimatum  bargaining  behavior. 
A  further  increase  of  R2  to  0.266  is achieved  if  one  substitutes  c  by 
the  (0,  1) dummy  variables  for  the  experiments  of  Binmore  et al.  and  of 
Ochs  and  Roth: 
4,  =  0.769  -  0.225  c’/c  -  0.109  Binmore  -  0.0997  Ochs, 
R2 =  0.266,  N =  425.  (6) 
A  corresponding  dummy  variable  for  the  experiments  of  Neelin  et  al. 
has  no  significant  influence.  Compared  to  the  results  of  Gtith  and  Tietz 
and  Neelin  et al. the  observations  of  Binmore  et al.  and  Ochs  and  Roth 
indicate  demands  which  ask  for  about  10% less of  the  cake.  This  can  be 
revealed  by  separate  regressions  yielding  similar  coefficients  for  the 
cake-shrinking  parameter  c’/c. 
An  analysis  of  variance  shows  a  sufficiently  significant  ((Y < 0.02) 
interaction  effect  between  the  experience  parameter  game  and  c’/c. 
Separate  regressions  for  the  three  experience  conditions  lead  to 
d,  =  0.656  -  0.137  c//c,  R2 =  0.039,  N =  197,  for  game  =  1,  (7a) 
((Y < 0.005) 
d,  =  0.698  -  0.246  c’/c,  R2 =  0.227,  N =  156,  for  game =  2,  (7b) 
(rir  =  0.729  -  0.346  c//c,  R2 =  0.420,  N =  72,  for  game  =  3.  (7c) 
Eqs.  (7)  indicate  a  monotonic  shift  towards  the  compromise  solution 
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retie  and  the  fifty-fifty  solution.  The  asymptotic  F-test  (Amemiya  1985) 
for  unequal  variances  shows with  FG9 =  6.68  that  the  structural  change 
is highly  significant  ((Y -C  0.002).  The  increase  of  R2  is accompanied  by 
a reduction  of  the  standard  error  from  0.125  to 0.092  to 0.041  underlin- 
ing  the  importance  of  experiments  in  which  subjects  can  learn  success- 
ful behavior  by experience.  A theory  of limited  rational  behavior,  which 
can  be  classified  as  rational  in  the  sense  of  goal-oriented  behavior, 
should  not  be  based  only  on  experiments  without  repetitions.  That 
experience  influences  the  coefficient  of  c’/c  is also  demonstrated  by  a 
global  regression  which  uses  the  product  of  c’/c  and  game  (game  = 
1,  2,  3)  as regressor  instead  of  c’/c.  Analogously  to  (6)  we obtain 
d,  =  0.665  + 0.0743  game -  0.147  game*  c’/c  -  0.118  Binmore 
-  0.112  Ochs,  R2=0.294,  N=425.  (8) 
Better  explanations  can  be  obtained  by  separate  investigations  of 
accepted  and  refused  demands.  The  gap  A =  1  c’/c  -  0.5 1  measures 
how  the  game-theoretic  prediction  deviates  from  the  equal  split  solu- 
tion  and  indicates  the  cognitive  pressure  due  to  these  two  competing 
behavioral  norms.  Using  the gap A as an additional  regressor  yields  the 
following  result  for  the  accepted  relative  demands  4;: 
4;  =  0.728  -  0.140  game*  c’/c  -  0.291  game*  A +  0.0981  game 
-  0.176  Ochs,  R2=0.653,  N=211.  (9) 
For  the  rejected  relative  demands  &  the  regressor  ‘game*  A’  is  not 
significant.  Eliminating  this  regressor  yields 
&  = 0.724  -  0.185  game*  c’/c  +  0.097  game  -  0.133  Ochs, 
R2  =  0.724,  N =  51.  001 
The  variable  ‘game * A’ indicates  learning  behavior  in  situations  where 
A  is  large,  i.e.,  when  the  two  behavioral  norms  c&* =  1 -  c’/c  and 
d,  =  0.5  predict  very  different  outcomes.  From  eqs.  (9)  and  (10)  one 
might  therefore  conclude  that  acceptance  results  from  learning  to  make 
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relative  demand  is  significantly  smaller  with  0.586  than  the  mean 
rejected  relative  demand  of  0.655  ( CY  -C  0.0001). 
5.  Final  remarks 
Giith  et  al.  (1982)  examined  experimentally  ultimatum  bargaining 
behavior  in  order  to  develop  bargaining  theory  by  first  looking  at  the 
most  basic  bargaining  situations  and  then  trying  to  proceed  with  more 
complicated  situations.  Unfortunately,  although  ultimatum  bargaining 
seems  to  be  the  most  primitive  form  of  negotiations,  a  satisfying 
descriptive  theory  of  ultimatum  bargaining  is  not  yet  available.  As 
indicated  by  the  results  of  sections  2  and  3  ultimatum  bargaining 
behavior  depends  crucially  on  the  experimental  environment,  i.e.  on 
how  the  ultimatum  bargaining  game  is  embedded.  Since  a  similar 
dependency  on  environmental  aspects  will  be  true  for  most  (bargain- 
ing)  experiments,  we  will  not  discuss  this  here  in  more  detail. 
One  reason  why  ultimatum  bargaining  became  a  widely  known 
experimental  paradigm  is  that  experimentally  observed  ultimatum 
bargaining  behavior  clearly  contradicts  the  most  obvious  rationality 
requirements  of  game  theory  and  also  of  economic  theory.  For  some- 
body  who  always  thougth  that  human  decision  making  will  be  char- 
acterized  at  most  by  limited  rationality,  this  controversy  must  be 
somewhat  surprising.  Apparently  this  debate  is  far  from  being  settled. 
Experimentally  observed  ultimatum  bargaining  behavior  reveals  how 
considerations  of  distributive  justice  seriously  destroy  the  prospects  of 
exploiting  strategic  power.  Our  analysis  has  indicated  which  factors 
influence  demand  and  acceptance  behavior  in  ultimatum  bargaining 
experiments. 
It  could  be  shown  that  the  cake-shrinking  parameter  had  a  distinct 
negative  influence  on  _d, and  6,  in  first  rounds.  Its  influence  on  the 
acceptance  behavior  in  last-round  subgames  is  still  open.  The  strong 
effects  of  the  dummy  variables  for  the  experimental  procedure  under- 
line  their  importance.  To  explore  the  influence  of  experimental  proce- 
dures  one  might  consider  to  replicate  previous  experiments  of  other 
authors  as closely  as possible.  This  might,  for  instance,  indicate  whether 
the  way  of  recruiting,  advising,  and  introducing  subjects  is  responsible 
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The  empirical  results  for  ultimatum  bargaining  behavior  will help  to 
explain  decisions  in other  and  probably  more  complicated  situations  of 
strategic  interaction.  What  we have learned  is that  people  are willing  to 
sacrifice  considerable  monetary  amounts  in  order  to  punish  someone 
who  has  been  too  greedy  and  that  they  do  so  even  if  it  will  not  be  of 
any  help  for  them  in  the  future.  As  a consequence  the  usual  backward 
induction  procedure  underlying  the  concept  of  subgame  perfect  equi- 
libria  is  no  reliable  behavioral  concept.  Actual  decision  behavior  is 
obviously  a  result  of  both  forward  and  backward  induction.  This  is 
clearly  illustrated  by the impressing  results  of Neelin  et al. (1988)  which 
indicate  some  crude  form  of  forward  induction. 
In  our  view, this  has important  implications  for  the  interpretation  of 
many  game-theoretic  results  as,  for  instance,  the  Folk  Theorems  of 
game  theory  (see  Aumann  1981;  Fudenberg  and  Maskin,  1986;  and 
also  the  critical  discussion  of  Giith  et  al.  1988).  On  the  one  hand,  Folk 
Theorems  apply  the  concept  of  subgame  perfect  equilibria,  i.e.  back- 
ward  induction  rationality.  On  the  other  hand,  Folk  Theorems  allow  to 
vary  the  decision  behavior  in  strategically  equivalent  subgames  in  a 
forward  induction  manner  as  most  clearly  illustrated  by  tit  for  tat  or 
grim  strategies.  What  the  empirical  evidence  of  ultimatum  bargaining 
experiments  demonstrates  is that  people  are  really  willing  to  punish  as 
supposed  by  tit  for  tat  or  grim  strategies.  There  is  apparently  a rather 
sound  behavioral  basis  for  establishing  Folk  Theorem-like  behavioral 
conjectures.  This  explains  the  frequent  use and wide acceptance  of  Folk 
Theorem-like  arguments  although  Folk  Theorems  as  normative  state- 
ments  are  rather  questionable  (see  Giith  et  al.  1988). 
The  study  of Neelin  et al. (1988)  is interesting  since  it illustrates  how 
backward  induction  fails  to be  used when  extending  the possible  length 
of  bargaining  plays  from  two  to  more  bargaining  rounds.  One  should 
try  to  find  out  whether  this  result  is  still  valid  when  the  stakes  are 
higher  and/or  when  subjects  can  lose  money  as,  for  instance,  in  the 
experiments  where  positions  were auctioned.  Of  course,  one  should  also 
vary  the  equilibrium  payoff  distribution  in  order  to  see  how  the 
breakdown  of  backward  induction  is influenced  by  the  payoff  distribu- 
tion  which  it  determines. 
There  are  plans  to  further  explore  ultimatum  bargaining  behavior 
which,  as  far  as  we  know,  go  back  to  the  basic  situation  of  just  one 
bargaining  round.  Eric  van  Damme  has  suggested  to  investigate  situa- 
tions  where  player  1  can  allocate  c -  d,  among  several  players  and 448  W.  Giith,  R.  Tietz  /  Ulirmatum  bargarnrng  behauror 
where  he,  furthermore,  can  select  who  of  the  other  players  determines 
whether  his proposal  is accepted  or not.  More  specifically,  player  1 can 
choose  any  payoff  vector  x =  (x,,  . . . , xn)  with  x,  2  0  for  i = 1,.  . . , n 
and  x1 +  . . . +x,  =  c,  where  n  ( 2  3)  is  the  number  of  players,  as  well 
as  the  responder  r E  { 2,.  . . , n }.  The  main  hypotheses  concern  how 
variations  in  the  responder  r’s  information  about  x  influence  the 
decision  behavior  of  1 and  r.  The  responder,  for  instance,  might  know 
the  whole  vector  x,  or x,  only,  the  amount  allocated  to  him,  or  x1  and 
X r* 
Other  attempts  concern  ultimatum  bargaining  experiments  in  which 
player  2  is  only  incompletely  informed  about  the  cake  size  c.  Again 
there  are  various  possibilities  to  define  the  rules  of  such  games,  espe- 
cially  the  a priori  beliefs  of  player  2  about  the  cake  size  c. 
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